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Abstract. Probabilistic hydro-meteorological forecasts have
over the last decades been used more frequently to com-
municate forecast uncertainty. This uncertainty is twofold,
as it constitutes both an added value and a challenge for
the forecaster and the user of the forecasts. Many authors
have demonstrated the added (economic) value of probabilis-
tic over deterministic forecasts across the water sector (e.g.
flood protection, hydroelectric power management and nav-
igation). However, the richness of the information is also a
source of challenges for operational uses, due partially to
the difficulty in transforming the probability of occurrence
of an event into a binary decision. This paper presents the
results of a risk-based decision-making game on the topic of
flood protection mitigation, called “How much are you pre-
pared to pay for a forecast?”. The game was played at sev-
eral workshops in 2015, which were attended by operational
forecasters and academics working in the field of hydro-
meteorology. The aim of this game was to better understand
the role of probabilistic forecasts in decision-making pro-
cesses and their perceived value by decision-makers. Based
on the participants’ willingness-to-pay for a forecast, the re-
sults of the game show that the value (or the usefulness) of a
forecast depends on several factors, including the way users
perceive the quality of their forecasts and link it to the per-
ception of their own performances as decision-makers.
1 Introduction
In a world where hydrological extreme events, such as
droughts and floods, are likely to be increasing in inten-
sity and frequency, vulnerabilities are also likely to increase
(WMO, 2011; Wetherald and Manabe, 2002; Changnon
et al., 2000). In this context, building resilience is a vital ac-
tivity. One component of building resilience is establishing
early warning systems, of which hydrological forecasts are
key elements.
Hydrological forecasts suffer from inherent uncertainties,
which can be from diverse sources, including the model
structure, the observation errors, the initial conditions (e.g.
snow cover, soil moisture, reservoir storages) and the meteo-
rological forecasts of precipitation and temperature (Verkade
and Werner, 2011; He et al., 2009). The latter variables are
fundamental drivers of hydrological forecasts and are there-
fore major sources of uncertainty. In order to capture some of
this uncertainty, there has been a gradual adoption of prob-
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abilistic forecasting approaches, with the aim of providing
forecasters and forecast users with additional information not
contained in the deterministic forecasting approach. Whereas
“a deterministic forecast specifies a point estimate of the pre-
dictand (the variate being forecasted)”, “a probabilistic fore-
cast specifies a probability distribution function of the pre-
dictand” (Krzysztofowicz, 2001). For operational forecast-
ing, this is usually achieved by using different scenarios of
meteorological forecasts following the ensemble prediction
approach (Buizza, 2008; Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009).
Many authors have shown that probabilistic forecasts pro-
vide an added (economic) value compared to deterministic
forecasts (Buizza, 2008; Verkade and Werner, 2011; Pap-
penberger et al., 2015). This is due, for example, to the
quantification of uncertainty by probabilistic forecasting sys-
tems, their ability to better predict the probability of oc-
currence of an extreme event and the fact that they is-
sue more consistent successive forecasts (Dale et al., 2014;
Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009). This probability of occur-
rence makes the probabilistic forecasts useful in the sense
that they provide information applicable to different deci-
sion thresholds, essential since not all forecast users have the
same risk tolerance (Michaels, 2015; Buizza, 2008; Cloke
and Pappenberger, 2009). Probabilistic forecasts therefore
enable the quantification of the potential risk of impacts
(New et al., 2007) and, as a result, they can lead to more
optimal decisions for many hydrological operational applica-
tions, with the potential to realise benefits from better predic-
tions (Verkade and Werner, 2011; Ramos et al., 2013). These
applications are, for example, flood protection (Stephens
and Cloke, 2014; Verkade and Werner, 2011), hydroelec-
tric power management (García-Morales and Dubus, 2007;
Boucher et al., 2012) and navigation (Meissner and Klein,
2013). Moreover, the continuous increase in probabilistic
forecast skill is very encouraging for the end-users of the
probabilistic forecasts (Bauer et al., 2015; Magnusson and
Källén, 2013; Simmons and Hollingsworth, 2002; Ferrell,
2009).
However, the communication of uncertainty through prob-
abilistic forecasts and the use of uncertain forecasts in
decision-making are also challenges for their operational
use (Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009; Ramos et al., 2010;
Michaels, 2015; Crochemore et al., 2015). One of the rea-
sons why the transition from deterministic to probabilis-
tic forecasts is not straightforward is the difficulty in trans-
forming a probabilistic value into a binary decision (Dale
et al., 2014; Demeritt et al., 2007; Pappenberger et al., 2015).
Moreover, decision-makers do not always understand prob-
abilistic forecasts the way forecasters intend them to (Hand-
mer and Proudley, 2007). This is why it is essential to bridge
the gap between forecast production and hazard mitigation,
and to foster communication between the forecasters and the
end-users of the forecasts (Cloke and Pappenberger, 2009;
Michaels, 2015).
As (Michaels, 2015) notes, “the extent to which forecasts
shape decision making under uncertainty is the true measure
of the worth of a forecast”. The potential added value of the
forecast can furthermore only be entirely realised with full
buy-in from the decision-makers. However, how much are
users aware of this added value? How much are they ready to
pay for a forecast? These are questions that motivated the
work presented in this paper. In order to understand how
users perceive the value of probabilistic forecasts in decision-
making, we designed a risk-based decision-making game –
called “How much are your prepared to pay for a forecast?”
– focusing on the use of forecasts for flood protection. The
game was played during the European Geophysical Union
(EGU) General Assembly meeting 2015 (Vienna, Austria),
at the Global Flood Partnership (GFP) workshop 2015 (Boul-
der, Colorado), as well as at Bristol University (BU) in 2015.
Games are increasingly promoted and used to convey infor-
mation of scientific relevance. They foster learning, dialogue
and action through real-world decisions, which allow the
study of the complexities hidden behind real-world decision-
making in an entertaining and interactive set-up (Mendler
de Suarez et al., 2012).
This paper presents the details of the game and the re-
sults obtained from its different applications. The partici-
pants’ perceived forecast value is analysed by investigating
the way participants use the forecasts in their decisions and
their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a probabilistic forecast.
The WTP is the amount an individual is inclined to disburse
to acquire a good or a service, or to avoid something undesir-
able (Breidert et al., 2006; Leviäkangas, 2009). It is a widely
and very commonly adopted method to make perceived value
assessments and its use has been demonstrated in a meteo-
rological context (Leviäkangas, 2009; Anaman et al., 1998;
Rollins and Shaykewich, 2003; Breidert et al., 2006). (Brei-
dert et al., 2006) present a complete overview of the meth-
ods available, organised by data collection types. According
to their classification, there exist two main WTP measuring
approaches: the “revealed preference” and the “stated pref-
erence”. The former describes price-response methods (such
as market data analysis, laboratory experiments and auctions,
amongst others), while the latter refers to surveys in gen-
eral. This experiment combines both “revealed preference”
and “stated preference” methods. The design of the game is
described in Sect. 2 and justified in terms of the purpose and
contribution of the different components of the game to its
main aim. The results and the discussion promoted by the
latter are subsequently presented in Sects. 3 and 4 respec-
tively.
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Figure 1. (a) Experiment set-up and (b) flow diagram of the game decision problem for one case.
2 Set-up of the decision-making game
2.1 Experimental design
This game was inspired by the table game “Pay-
ing for Predictions”, designed by the Red Cross/Red
Crescent Climate Centre (http://www.climatecentre.org/
resources-games/paying-for-predictions). Its focus is how-
ever different. Here, our aim is to investigate the use of fore-
casts for flood protection and mitigation. Also, we strongly
adapted the game to be played during conferences and with
large audiences.
The set-up of the game (illustrated in Fig. 1a) was the fol-
lowing: participants were told that they were competing for
the position of head of the flood protection team of a com-
pany. Their goal was to protect inhabitants of a fictitious town
bordering a fictitious river against flood events, while spend-
ing as little money as possible during the game. The partic-
ipant with the highest amount of money at the end of the
game was chosen as head of the flood protection team. Each
participant was randomly assigned a river (river yellow, river
blue or river green) for the entire duration of the game. Each
river had distinct initial river levels and rates of flood occur-
rences (see Table 1). Participants worked independently and
had a worksheet to take notes (see Appendix A). An initial
purse of 20 000 tokens was given to each player to be used
throughout the game.
Based on this storyline, the participants were presented
the following sequence of events (illustrated in Fig. 1b): af-
ter being given their river’s initial level (ranging from 10 to
60 included), each participant was asked to make use of a
probabilistic forecast (see Fig. 1b) of their river level incre-
ment after rainfall (ranging from 10 to 80 included) to de-
cide whether they wanted to pay for flood protection or not.
The cost of flood protection was 2000 tokens. They were in-
formed, prior to the start of the game, that a flood occurred if
Table 1. Number of flood events for each round of the game and
each river.
Round River
Yellow Green Blue
1 1 2 3
2 3 2 1
Total 4 4 4
the sum of the initial river level and the river level increment
after rainfall (i.e. the actual river level after rainfall) reached
a given threshold of 90. The probabilistic forecasts were vi-
sualised using boxplot distributions. They had a spread of
about 10–20, and indicated the 5th and 95th percentiles as
well as the median (i.e. 50th percentile) and the lower and
upper quartiles (i.e. 25th and 75th percentiles respectively)
of the predicted river level increment after rainfall. Forecasts
were given to participants case by case (i.e. when playing
the first case, they could only see the boxplot distribution
of forecast river increment for case 1). Once the participants
had made their decisions using both pieces of information
(i.e. river level before rainfall and forecast of river level in-
crement), they were given the observed (actual) river level
increment after rainfall for their rivers. If a flood occurred
and the participant had not bought flood protection, a damage
cost (i.e. price paid when no protection was bought against a
flood that actually happened) of 4000 tokens had to be paid.
The monetary values (initial purse, price of flood protec-
tion and damage cost) were deliberately chosen. The price of
a protection was set to 2000 tokens such that if a participant
decided to buy flood protection every time during the game
(i.e. two rounds of five cases each, thus ten times) they would
have no tokens left in their purse at the end of the game. This
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was done in order to discourage such a behaviour. The dam-
age cost was set to twice the flood protection cost as this was
estimated to be a realistic relation between the two prices
based on (Pappenberger et al., 2015). The latter states that
the avoided damages due to early flood warning amount to a
total of about 40 %. Here, for simplicity, we used a percent-
age of 50 %.
Once the context was explained, the participants were then
told that they would first play one round of five independent
cases, which would each be played exactly according to the
sequence of events presented, and for which they would have
to record their decisions on the worksheet they were provided
(see Appendix A). The game had a total of two rounds of
five cases each. This specific number of cases and rounds
was chosen because of the time constraint to play the game
during conferences (the game should last around 20–30 min
only). Table 1 presents the total number of flood events for
each round and each river. The number of flood events was
different for every river for each round as river level values
were randomly generated for the purpose of the game. This
allowed the exploration of the influence of different flood fre-
quencies in round 1 on the participants’ WTP for a second
forecast set. The number of flood events was however sam-
pled to some extent in order to obtain decreasing (increas-
ing) numbers of flood events between the two rounds for the
blue (yellow) river, or constant throughout the two rounds for
the green river. This was done to investigate the effect of the
change (or not) in flood frequency between rounds 1 and 2
on the participants’ strategies throughout the game.
During the first round of the game, the participants had
forecasts of river level increments to help their decisions.
These forecasts were however not available for all partici-
pants in the second round, but were sold between the two
rounds through an auction. The purpose and set-up of each
round and the auction are explained in the following para-
graphs.
2.1.1 Round 1
The objective of the first round was to familiarise the partici-
pants with the probabilistic forecasts they were given to help
them in their decisions, and to create a diversity amongst the
decision-makers in terms of
– their river behaviour: which is why different rivers, each
with different flood frequencies and different initial lev-
els, were assigned to the participants;
– the money they would spend during this round and have
in hand for the ensuing auction (before round 2);
– the quality of their forecasts in the first round: to this
end, different forecast sets were distributed to the play-
ers for round 1.
This diversity was triggered in round 1 in order to analyse
whether or not the WTP for a second forecast set, measured
in the auction performed before round 2, was dependent on
any of the factors inherent to the first round (i.e. river-specific
flood frequency, money left in purse, or quality of the fore-
casts).
Before the start of the first round each participant was
given a forecast set containing probabilistic forecasts of their
river level increment after rainfall for the five cases of round
1. Participants were however not aware that three different
forecast sets were produced for each of the rivers. One set had
only forecasts with a positive bias (forecast sets 1), the sec-
ond set had only unbiased forecasts (forecast sets 2) and the
third set only forecasts with a negative bias (forecast sets 3).
There were therefore nine different sets of forecasts which
were distributed randomly amongst the audience prior to the
start of the game. The three different forecast types were ob-
tained by varying the position of the observation inside the
forecast distribution. The unbiased forecasts had the obser-
vations fall between the lower and upper quartiles of their
distributions, while the biased forecasts had the observations
fall outside of the lower and upper quartiles of their distri-
butions, leading to over- (positively biased forecast sets) or
under-predictions (negatively biased forecast sets) of the ob-
servations.
The quality of each forecast set can be represented in terms
of the number of correct forecast flood events (given a fore-
cast percentile threshold) with respect to the number of ob-
served flood events. For each forecast set type and each river,
the number of forecast flood events during the first round was
calculated by adding the median of the forecast river level in-
crement to the initial river level for each case. A forecast is
referred to as a false alarm if this sum forecasts a flood (i.e.
it exceeds the flood threshold) but the flood is subsequently
not observed. It is referred to as a hit if the sum forecasts
the flood and the flood is subsequently observed. A miss is
an observed flood that was not forecast. The numbers of hits,
misses and false alarms are usually gathered in a contingency
table as a matrix (e.g. Table 2): hits are placed on top, left,
misses on bottom, left, and false alarms on top, right. The
place on bottom, right is usually not considered in the eval-
uation of forecasts as it represents situations of low interest
to a forecaster (i.e. when floods are neither forecast nor ob-
served). Table 2 displays the nine contingency tables we ob-
tain considering each forecast set type and each river. Each
participant would find themselves in one of the contingency
tables represented. We can see the higher number of total
misses (false alarms) considering all rivers together in neg-
atively (positively) biased forecast sets, and the absence of
these in the unbiased forecast sets.
After all the five cases of round 1 were played, participants
were asked to rate their performance as a decision-maker and
the quality of their forecast set for round 1 on a scale from
“very bad” to “very good” (the option “I don’t know” was
also available) (see Appendix A).
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Table 2. Contingency table for each river and forecast set type for
the first round (considering the 50th percentile, i.e. the median fore-
cast). The numbers for a specific river-forecast set type represent,
clockwise from the top left, hits (italics), false alarms (bold), cor-
rect negatives (–) and misses (regular).
Forecast set type River
Yellow Green Blue
Positively biased
1 1 2 1 3 2
0 – 0 – 0 –
Unbiased
1 0 2 0 3 0
0 – 0 – 0 –
Negatively biased
0 0 2 0 2 0
1 – 0 – 1 –
2.1.2 Auction
The auction was carried out after round 1 in order to measure
the participants’ WTP for a second forecast set and to eval-
uate its dependencies on any of the elements of the game in
round 1. The auction was implemented as follows.
At the end of the first round participants were asked to
transfer the remaining tokens from round 1 to the second
round. They were then told that the forecasting centre dis-
tributing the probabilistic forecasts now wanted the decision-
makers to pay for the forecast sets if they wanted to have ac-
cess to them for the second round. Furthermore, they were
informed that only 30 % of them could get a second forecast
set for this round. This percentage was chosen in order to
restrict the number of participants that could buy a forecast
set (and create a competitive auction), while keeping a high
enough number of participants playing with a forecast set in
round 2 for the analysis of the results.
Participants were then asked to make a sealed bid, writing
down on their worksheets the number of tokens they were
willing to disburse from their final purse of round 1 to obtain
a set of probabilistic forecasts for all five cases of round 2.
After the bids were made, a forecast set was distributed to
the participants within the highest 30 % of the bids. This was
done through an auction. It was carried out by asking the par-
ticipants whether any of them wrote down a bid superior or
equal to 10 000 tokens. If any participants did, they raised
their hands, after which a forecast set – for the same river as
the river assigned to them at the beginning of the game – was
given to them. The auction continued by lowering the num-
ber of tokens stated to the participants until all forecast sets
for round 2 were distributed. Each participant having bought
a forecast set for round 2 was then asked to disburse the num-
ber of tokens they paid for this forecast set from their remain-
ing purse from round 1.
We note that participants were not told that the forecasts
for the second round were all unbiased forecasts. Once again,
the quality of the forecasts was kept secret in order for the
participants to assign a value to the second forecast set that
would strictly be related to the conditions under which they
played the first round.
2.1.3 Round 2
The second round was played in order to measure the added
value of an unbiased forecast set, compared to no forecast
set at all, to the decisions of the participants on protecting
or not against floods. Moreover, as the winner of the game
was determined by the number of tokens left in their purse
at the end of the game, this round would give a chance to
participants who bought a second forecast set to make up for
the money spent with the auction, during round 2.
The second round developed similarly to the first round,
with five independent cases of decision-making, with the ex-
ception that only participants who bought a second forecast
set could use it to make their decisions. Participants who did
not buy a second forecast set did not have any forecasts on
which to base their decisions.
After the five cases were played, the participants were
asked to once again answer a set of questions (see Ap-
pendix A). They were asked to rate their performance as a
decision-maker in the second round, on a scale from “very
bad” to “very good” (the option “I don’t know” was also
available). Participants without a second forecast set were
invited to provide a justification for not purchasing a set of
forecasts for this round. Participants who had bought a sec-
ond forecast set were also asked to rate the quality of their
forecast set for round 2 (on a scale from “very bad” to “very
good”; the option “I don’t know” was also available) and
whether those were worth the price they had paid for them. If
not, they were asked to provide a new price that they would
have rather paid.
The winner was finally determined by finding the player
with the largest number of tokens in their purse at the end of
the game.
2.2 Objectives and evaluation strategy
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the participants’
WTP for a probabilistic forecast set in the context of flood
protection, following the game experiment designed as pre-
sented in the previous paragraphs. It unfolds into two objec-
tives that were pursued in the analysis of the results:
1. to analyse how participants used the information they
were provided (probabilistic forecast sets) in this risk-
based decision-making context, and
2. to characterise the participants’ WTP for a probabilistic
forecast set for flood protection.
We assess these objectives through six questions, which
are presented below, together with the evaluation strategy im-
plemented.
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2.2.1 Did the participants use their forecasts and, in
this case, follow the 50th percentile of their
forecast during the decision-making process?
This first question was investigated using the results of the
first round. We first wanted to know whether the players were
actually using their forecasts to make their decisions. More-
over, we searched for clues indicating that the participants
were following the 50th percentile (i.e. the median) of the
probabilistic forecasts. This was done in order to see whether
the 50th percentile was considered by the players as the op-
timal value to use for the decision-making process under this
specific flood risk experiment. Additionally, this question re-
lates to an intrinsic characteristic of the use of probabilis-
tic forecasts for decision-making, which is the difficulty in
transforming the probabilistic values into a binary decision
(Dale et al., 2014; Demeritt et al., 2007; Pappenberger et al.,
2015). The way in which probabilistic flood forecasts are
used depends on attitudes of decision-makers towards risk,
the uncertainty and the error in the information provided to
them (Demeritt et al., 2007; Ramos et al., 2013), and deci-
sions can vary from one participant to the next provided the
same information (Crochemore et al., 2015).
Question one was explored by looking at the worksheets
collected in order to infer from the decisions taken by the par-
ticipants whether or not they most probably used the median
of their forecasts to consider whether the river level would
be above, at or under the flood threshold. In cases where the
decisions did not coincide with what the median forecast in-
dicated, other factors that could also influence the decisions
were considered, such as (a) the flood frequency of each river
and their initial river levels, (b) the forecast set type each par-
ticipant had (i.e. biased – positively or negatively – or unbi-
ased) and (c) the familiarity of the participants with prob-
abilistic forecasts and decision-making (given their occupa-
tion and years of experience).
2.2.2 Was there a correspondence between the way
participants perceived the quality of their
forecasts in round 1 and their “true” quality?
A well-known effect, called the “cry wolf”, was studied
for weather-related decision-making by LeClerc and Joslyn
(2015). It describes the reluctance of users to comply with
future alarms when confronted in the past with false alarms.
This leads to the second question which was explored in this
paper: was there a correspondence between the way partici-
pants perceived the quality of their forecasts in round 1 and
their “true” quality? Our aim here is to investigate whether
the participants were more sensitive to false alarms or misses.
The participants’ answers to the question on their forecast
set quality for the first round (see Appendix A) were anal-
ysed against their “true” quality. The latter was measured in
terms of forecast bias, calculated from the hits, false alarms
and misses presented in Table 2. A bias value was computed
for each forecast set type of each river (i.e. each contingency
table; there were therefore nine different bias values in total)
with the following equation:
Bias= hits + false alarms
hits + misses . (1)
A bias value equal to one is a perfect value (which corre-
sponds to unbiased forecasts), and a value less than (superior
to) one indicates under- (over-)prediction.
2.2.3 Did the participants’ perceptions of their own
performance coincide with their “true”
performance?
We also looked at the perception the participants had of their
own performance. The answers to the question “How was
your performance as a decision-maker” (see Appendix A)
were assessed against the participants’ “true” performances
(in rounds 1 and 2), which were calculated in terms of the
money participants spent as a consequence of their decisions.
The following general formula (n being the round number)
was used:
Performance= Money spent round n
Optimal
. (2)
The performance is expressed relatively to an optimal per-
formance, which is the minimum amount a participant could
have spent, given the river they were assigned, defined as
Optimal= Protection cost × Number of floods in round n. (3)
A performance value of one indicates an optimal perfor-
mance. Performance values greater than one indicate that
participants spent more money than the minimum amount
necessary to protect the city from the observed floods. The
greater the value, the higher the amount of money unneces-
sarily spent.
2.2.4 What was the participants’ willingness-to-pay for
a probabilistic forecast set?
The auction was incorporated into the experiment in order to
explore the WTP of participants for a probabilistic forecast
set, considering the risk-based decision-making problem pro-
posed by the game. To characterise this WTP, the bids were
analysed and their relationships with several other aspects of
the game were explored to explain the differences (if any) in
the bids. These aspects were the following.
– The way participants used the forecasts. Here we try to
learn about the effectiveness of the information on the
user, which is an attribute of the value of information
(Leviäkangas, 2009). It is assumed that a participant is
not expected to be willing to disburse any money for
information they are not using. The answers to question
one (i.e. “Did the participants use their forecasts and,
in this case, follow the 50th percentile of their forecast
during the decision-making process?”) are used here.
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– The money available to participants after round 1 to
make their bids. As participants were informed at the
beginning of the game that the winner would be the
player with the highest number of tokens in purse at
the end of the game, the tokens they had in hand for
the auction (after round 1) may have restricted them in
their bids. The bids are thus also explored relative to the
number of tokens in hand at the time of the auction.
– The forecast set type. The bias of the forecasts during
round 1 could also have been a potential determinant of
participants’ WTP for a forecast set in round 2.
– The river flood frequency. This was different for all the
rivers in the first round and could be an element of the
relevance of the information, another attribute of the
value of information (Leviäkangas, 2009). Indeed, one
could ask: “If my river never floods, why should I pay
for forecasts?”.
– The years of experience and occupation. This might in-
fluence the familiarity participants may have with the
use of probabilistic forecasts for decision-making.
2.2.5 Did participants with a forecast set perform
better than those without?
Round 2 was led by a central question: did participants with
a forecast set perform better than those without? It was in-
vestigated by looking at the performance of participants in
round 2, calculated from Eq. (2). While we expect players
with more (unbiased) information to make better decisions,
other factors could have influenced the trust participants had
in the information during round 2, such as, for instance,
the quality of the forecasts experienced by participants in
round 1 or the flood events observed in the river in round 2,
compared to the experience participants had previously had
in round 1.
2.2.6 What were the winning and losing strategies (if
any)?
Finally, from the final results of the game, a question arose:
what were the winning and losing strategies (if any)? This
question was explored by looking at the characteristics (e.g.
river assigned, forecast set type in round 1, performances in
both rounds, purchase of a second forecast set) and decisions
of the participants during the game, in order to distinguish
common attributes for the winning and losing strategies.
Furthermore, an “avoided cost” was calculated for each
river based on the difference between the tokens spent by par-
ticipants without a second forecast set and the tokens spent
by participants with a second forecast set, during round 2. It
represents the average number of tokens participants without
a second forecast set lost by protecting when a flood did not
occur or by not protecting when a flood did occur, compared
Table 3. Distribution of the 129 worksheets collected for the anal-
ysis per river (yellow, green and blue) and forecast set type (posi-
tively biased, unbiased and negatively biased).
Forecast set type River Total
Yellow Green Blue
Positively biased 15 11 18 44
Unbiased 13 21 9 43
Negatively biased 11 19 12 42
Total 39 51 39 129
to participants with a second forecast set. This “avoided cost”
was measured and compared to the average bid of partici-
pants for each river in order to evaluate participants’ estima-
tion of the value of the forecasts compared to their “true”
value in terms of the money they enabled the participants
with a second forecast set to save in the second round. An av-
erage “new bid” was also calculated by replacing the bids of
participants who had said that their forecast set in the second
round was not worth the price they had paid initially, with
the new bids they would have rather paid (see Appendix A).
This average “new bid” was compared to the “avoided cost”
and the actual average bid obtained from the auction.
3 Results
The results are based on the analysis of 129 worksheets from
the 145 worksheets collected. The remaining 16 worksheets
were either incomplete or incorrectly completed and were
thus not used. Table 3 shows the distribution of the 129 work-
sheets among the three forecast set types and the three rivers.
The game was played at the different events mentioned
in the introduction. The participants present at those events
displayed a diversity in terms of their occupation and years
of experience. This was surveyed at the beginning of the
game and is presented in Fig. 2, for all the participants as
well as for each river and forecast set type separately. Par-
ticipants were mainly academics (postdoctoral researchers,
PhDs, research scientists, lecturers, professors and students),
followed by professionals (forecasters, operational hydrolo-
gists, scientists, engineers and consultants). The majority had
less than 5 years of experience.
3.1 Participants were using the forecasts, but consistent
patterns of use are difficult to detect
Figure 3 presents, on the one hand, the final purses of all the
participants at the end of round 1, according to their river and
forecast set type (columns and rows respectively), and, on
the other hand, the final purses that participants would have
had if they had made their decisions according to the me-
dian of their forecasts. Participants in charge of the yellow
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Figure 2. Number of participants according to occupation and years
of experience. The categories of occupations are academics (post-
doctoral researchers, PhDs, research scientists, lecturers, professors
and students), professionals (forecasters, operational hydrologists,
scientists, engineers and consultants) and others. Top: overall par-
ticipant distribution; middle: distribution according to their river;
bottom: distribution according to the forecast quality types (1: pos-
itively biased, 2: unbiased and 3: negatively biased).
river (first column) ended the first round with, on average,
more tokens than the others. Participants playing with the
blue river (last column) are those who ended round 1 with
less money in purse, on average. This is due to the higher
number of flood events for the blue river in round 1 (see Ta-
ble 1). There are also differences in terms of final purses for
the participants assigned the same river but given a differ-
ent forecast set type. Overall, participants who had unbiased
forecasts (middle row) ended the first round with on average
more money than the other players. These results are an indi-
cation that the participants were using their forecasts to make
their decisions.
In order to see whether the participants were using the me-
dian values of the forecasts, a forecast final purse was com-
puted considering the case where the participants followed
the median of their forecasts for all the cases of the first round
(red vertical lines shown in Fig. 3). If the participants had
followed the median values of the forecasts during the entire
first round, their final purses would have been equal to this
value. Although this is almost the case for participants with
unbiased forecast sets (for all rivers), for participants with the
yellow river and positively biased forecast sets and the green
river and negatively biased forecast sets, it is not an overall
generally observed behaviour.
Could some participants have discovered the bias in their
forecasts and adjusted them for their decisions? Although it
is hard to answer this question from the worksheets only,
some of the decisions taken seem to support this idea. Fig-
ure 4 presents in more detail the results for the blue river in
Figure 3. Participants’ round 1 final purses for each river (from the
leftmost to the rightmost column: the yellow, the green and the blue
river) and for each forecast set type (from the top to the bottom row:
positively biased, unbiased and negatively biased). The red lines
show the final purses that the participants of a given river-forecast
set type group would have gotten if they had followed the median
of their forecasts for all five cases of the first round.
the first round. The forecast final levels are shown as box-
plots for each forecast set type and for each of the five cases
of round 1. These are the levels the river would reach if the
initial level is added to the percentiles of the forecasts for
each case. The bars at the bottom of the figure show the per-
centages of participants whose decisions differed from what
the median of their forecast final level indicated (i.e. partici-
pants who bought (or did not buy) protection while no flood
(or a flood) was predicted by the median of their forecast).
When comparing cases 1 and 4, for which the initial river
levels and the observed and forecast final river levels were
the same, we would not expect any changes in the way par-
ticipants were using their forecasts. This is however not true.
Figure 4 shows that the percentages of participants not fol-
lowing their forecast median differs between the two cases.
For instance, about 80 % of the participants with negatively
biased forecast sets (under-predicting the increment of the
river level) did not follow the median forecast in case 1, and
did not protect against the predicted flood by their median
forecast, while this percentage drops to about 20 % in case 4.
The fact that they were not consistently acting the same way
may be an indication that they found out the bias in the fore-
casts and tried to compensate for it throughout round 1. We
can also see that, in general, the lowest percentages of partic-
ipants not following the median forecast are for the unbiased
forecast set. This is especially observed in the cases where
the forecast final levels given by the median forecast are well
above or below the flood threshold (cases 1, 2, 4, 5). The
fact that from case 1 to case 4, for unbiased forecast sets,
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Figure 4. Observed initial and final river levels for the blue river
for each case of the first round. The boxplots show the forecast final
river levels by each forecast set type (negatively biased, unbiased
and positively biased). The bars display the percentages of partic-
ipants whose decisions did not correspond to what their forecast
median indicated.
we moved from about 10 % of participants not following the
median forecast to 0 %, may also indicate that they built con-
fidence in their forecasts (at least in the median value) along
round 1, by perceiving that the median forecast could be a
good indication of possible flooding or not in their river.
Figure 4 also shows that some participants with unbiased
forecasts did not always follow the median of their forecasts
(for instance, cases 1, 3 and 5). Additional factors may there-
fore have influenced the way participants used their forecasts.
A number of worksheets indicated that the distance of the
initial river level to the flood threshold could have been in-
fluential. In a few cases where the median forecast clearly
indicated a flood, while the initial river level was low, some
players did not purchase any flood protection. This can be
observed in Fig. 4 for case 1, for example, for participants
with positively biased or unbiased forecast sets. The inverse
situation (i.e. the initial river level was high, but the river
level forecast by the median was low, below the flood thresh-
old) was also observed and is illustrated in Fig. 4 for case 2
and negatively biased forecast sets. Hence, in some cases, the
initial river level seemed to also play a role in the decisions
taken.
There are indications that the participants could also have
used other percentiles of the forecast to make their deci-
sions, especially in cases where the median of the forecast
was marginally above or below the flood threshold. For ex-
ample, in case 4, the entire unbiased forecast lies above the
flood threshold and all the participants chose the same and
correct action. In cases where the 5th or 95th percentiles of
the forecast fell above or below the flood threshold, the par-
ticipants showed less consistent decisions (e.g. case 3 for un-
biased forecast sets).
Figure 5. Cumulative percentages of participants who rated their
forecast quality from “very bad” to “very good”, as a function of the
forecast set bias (“true” forecast quality; Eq. 1) in round 1. A bias
equal to one indicates perfect forecasts; a bias less than (superior
to) one indicates under- (over-)prediction.
Other possible influencing factors, such as occupation and
years of experience, were also investigated (not shown). No
strong indications that these factors could have played a role
in the participants’ decision-making were however found.
3.2 Participants were overall less tolerant to misses
than to false alarms in round 1
Figure 5 displays the cumulative percentages of participants
having answered that the quality of their forecast set in
round 1 (see Appendix A) was “very bad” to “very good”,
as a function of the “true” quality of the corresponding fore-
casts, measured by the forecast set bias (Eq. 1). While par-
ticipants with forecast sets for which the bias equalled one
(perfect value) mostly rated their forecasts “quite good” or
“very good”, the percentage of negative perceptions of the
quality of the forecasts increases with increasing or decreas-
ing forecast bias.
It is interesting to note that participants with forecasts bi-
ased towards over-prediction never rated their forecasts as
“very bad”. Also noteworthy is the very good rating given by
participants with the most negatively biased forecasts (bias of
0). These participants belonged to the yellow river and had
negatively biased forecasts in round 1. There was only one
flood event for river yellow in the first round, which occurred
at the end of the round and which was missed by the nega-
tively biased forecasts. During the analysis of the results, it
was observed that only about 25 % of the yellow river partic-
ipants given the negatively biased forecasts did not purchase
flood protection for this flood. An explanation for this low
percentage could be that participants had time to learn about
their forecasts’ quality until the occurrence of the flood at the
end of the first round. This low number of participants who
www.hydrol-earth-syst-sci.net/20/3109/2016/ Hydrol. Earth Syst. Sci., 20, 3109–3128, 2016
3118 L. Arnal et al.: Willingness-to-pay for a probabilistic flood forecast
Figure 6. Number of participants having rated their performance as a decision-maker from “very bad” to “very good” in round 1, as a
function of (a) their “true” performance (calculated from Eq. 2), and (b) their perceived forecast set quality. A performance value of one
denotes a “true” performance equal to the optimal performance (Eq. 3). The larger the performance value, the more distant from optimal the
decisions were during round 1. The size and the colour of the point indicate the number of participants that fall into a specific perceived–actual
performance combination or perceived performance–forecast set quality combination.
actually suffered from their negative bias and the presence of
only one miss out of the five cases of round 1 could therefore
justify the good rating of their forecasts by those participants.
Overall, forecasts exhibiting under-prediction seem to be
less appreciated by the participants. This could be an indi-
cation that participants were less tolerant to misses, while
they accepted better forecasts leading to false alarms (over-
predictions). This is contrary to the “cry wolf” effect, and
could be explained by the particular game set-up for which
the damage cost (4000 tokens) was twice the protection cost
(2000 tokens).
3.3 Participants had a good perception of their good
(or bad) performance during the game and related
it to the quality of their forecasts
Figure 6a illustrates the answers to the question “How was
your performance as a decision-maker in round 1?” as a func-
tion of the participants’ “true” performance (calculated from
Eq. (2), i.e. the ratio to an optimal performance). The figure
shows the distribution of participants across all perceived–
actual performance combinations, for all rivers and forecast
set types combined. The perceived decision-maker perfor-
mance is presented on a scale from “very bad” to “very
good”. An overall positive relationship between the partic-
ipants’ perceived performance and their “true” performance
is observed: the best performances (i.e. performance values
of one or close to one) are indeed associated with a very good
perception of the performance by the decision-makers and
vice versa. The same analysis carried out for the answers
concerning round 2 (not displayed) showed similar results:
the ratings participants gave to their performance were simi-
larly close to their “true” performance.
Figure 6b looks at the relationship between the perceived
decision-maker performance and the rating the decision-
makers gave to their forecast set quality in round 1. A posi-
tive relationship can also be seen: the majority rated their per-
formance and the quality of their forecast set as “quite good”
and “very good”, while those who rated their performance
“very bad” also considered their forecast set “very bad”. The
rating participants gave to their performance was therefore
closely connected to the rating they gave to their forecast set
quality. This also contributes to the evidence that participants
were using their probabilistic forecast sets to make their deci-
sions. It is furthermore an indication that participants linked
good forecast quality to good performance in their decision-
making and vice versa.
3.4 Several factors may influence the WTP for a
forecast, including forecast quality and economic
situation
Given the evidence that most participants were using their
forecasts to make their decisions in round 1 (see Sect. 3.1),
we now investigate their willingness-to-pay (WTP) for a new
forecast set to be used in round 2.
Figure 7 shows the bids participants wrote on their work-
sheets prior to the auction, for a second forecast set, as a
function of the number of tokens they had in their purses at
the end of round 1. All bids are plotted and those from par-
ticipants who succeeded in buying a second forecast set are
displayed as red triangles in the figure. On average, partic-
ipants were willing to pay 4566 tokens, which corresponds
to 32 % of the average number of tokens left in their purses.
The minimum bid was zero tokens (i.e. no interest in buy-
ing forecasts for round 2), which was made by 10 % of the
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Figure 7. Bids declared by participants to purchase a forecast set
for round 2, as a function of the number of tokens they had left in
their purse at the end of round 1. The colour of the points indicates
the number of participants that fall into a specific bid–tokens left in
purse combination.
players. Half of these players were participants who were as-
signed the blue river (the river for which players ended the
first round with on average the lowest number of tokens in
purse). The only three participants who never bought flood
protection in the first round (i.e. who could be seen as “risk-
seeking” players) made bids of zero, 3000 and 4000 tokens.
The highest bid made was 14 000 tokens, corresponding to
100 % of the tokens left in that participant’s purse. However,
this participant did not raise their hand during the auction to
purchase a second forecast set. Nine participants (less than
10 % of the total number of players) made a bid of 10 000
tokens or above, corresponding to, on average, 77 % of the
tokens they had left in their purses. The total cost of protect-
ing all the time for round 2 being 10 000 tokens, as indicated
in Fig. 7 by the dashed black line, bidding 10 000 tokens or
more for a second forecast set was clearly pointless. Half
of these participants were players to which the yellow river
was assigned (the river that experienced the least number of
floods in round 1 and for which participants thus ended the
first round with on average the highest number of tokens left
in their purse) and eight out of these nine participants had
a forecast set with a bias during the first round. These nine
participants, who paid 10 000 tokens or more for the second
forecast set, were removed from the subsequent analyses of
the auction results, as their bids suggest that they have not
understood the stakes of the game.
From Fig. 7, there is a clear positive relationship between
the maximum bids within each value of tokens left in purse
and the tokens left in purse, as the participants did not dis-
burse more tokens than they had left in their purse during the
auction. When we look at the evolution of the median of the
bids with the number of tokens in purse, in general, the more
Figure 8. Participants’ % bids, bids expressed as a percentage of the
tokens participants had left in their purse at the time of the auction,
as a function of the rating they gave to their forecast set quality
in round 1 (from “very bad” to “very good”). The colour of the
points indicates the number of participants that fall into a specific
bid-perceived forecast set quality combination.
tokens one had left in purse, the higher their WTP for a fore-
cast set. Nonetheless, the WTP seems to have a limit. It can
be seen that from a certain number of tokens left in purse,
the median value of the bids remains almost constant (in our
game case, at about a bid of 6000 tokens for participants with
12 000 tokens or more in their purse). The number of tokens
that the participants had in hand therefore only influenced to
a certain extent their WTP for a second probabilistic forecast
set.
We also investigated whether the way participants per-
ceived the quality of their forecast set in the first round was
a plausible determinant of their WTP for another forecast set
to be used in round 2. Figure 8 shows the % bids (i.e. bids
expressed as a percentage of the tokens participants had left
in their purse at the time of the auction) as a function of the
rating participants gave to their forecast set quality in round 1
(from “very bad” to “very good”; see Appendix A). Firstly,
it is interesting to observe that three participants judged their
first forecast set to have been of “very bad” quality but were
nonetheless willing to disburse on average 50 % of the to-
kens they had left in purse. Those bids were however quite
low, 4000 tokens on average. Moreover, players who rated
their first forecast set from “quite good” to “very good” were
on average willing to disburse a larger percentage of their
tokens than candidates who rated their previous forecast set
from “quite bad” to “neither good nor bad”. Therefore, the
way participants rated the quality of their first forecast set
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Table 4. Distribution of the 44 forecast sets sold during the auction,
per river (yellow, green and blue) and forecast set type (positively
biased, unbiased and negatively biased).
Forecast set type River Total
Yellow Green Blue
Positively biased 5 2 6 13
Unbiased 6 9 3 18
Negatively biased 3 10 0 13
Total 14 21 9 44
was to a certain degree influential on their WTP for a second
forecast set.
During the auction following the closed bids, 44 forecast
sets were distributed to the participants who made the high-
est bids, in order to be used in round 2. Table 4 shows that
participants who purchased these second forecast sets were
quite well distributed among the different forecast set types
of round 1, with a slightly higher frequency of buyers among
participants who had played round 1 with unbiased forecasts;
42 % of all participants with unbiased forecasts purchased a
second forecast set, while 30 % (31 %) of participants with
positively biased (negatively biased) forecasts bought a sec-
ond forecast set. Buyers also belonged more often to the
group assigned river green (48 %, or 41 % of all green river
participants), followed by rivers yellow (32 %, or 36 % of all
yellow river participants) and blue (20, or 23 % of all blue
river participants). The higher percentage of green river par-
ticipants buying a second forecast set could have been due to
a combination of the river green flood frequency in round 1
(not as low as for the yellow river, making it more relevant
for green river participants to buy a second forecast set) and
of money left in purse (on average, not as low as for the blue
river participants). The buyers of the second forecast sets are
displayed as red triangles in Fig. 7. We note that these red tri-
angles are not necessarily the highest bid values in the figure,
since we plot results from several applications of the game (in
one unique application, they would coincide with the highest
bids, unless a participant had a high bid but had not raised
their hand during the auction to buy a second forecast set).
Differences in the highest bids among the applications of the
game could be an indication that the size (or type) of the au-
dience might have had an impact on the bids (i.e. the WTP
for a probabilistic forecast). Our samples were however not
large enough to analyse this aspect.
Participants who did not purchase a second probabilistic
forecast set (85 players in total) stated their reason for do-
ing so. The majority of them (66 %, or 56 players) said that
the price was too high (which means, in other words, that the
bids made by the other participants were too high, preventing
them from purchasing a second forecast set during the auc-
tion). Ten participants (12 %) argued that the model did not
seem reliable. Most of these participants were among those
who had indeed received a forecast set with a bias in the first
round. The rest of the candidates who did not purchase a sec-
ond forecast set (22 %, or 19 players) wrote down on their
worksheet the following reasons.
– Low flood frequency in the first round – a participant
assigned the yellow river wrote: “Climatology seemed
probability of flood = 0.2”.
– Assessment of the value of the forecasts difficult – a par-
ticipant wrote: “No information for the initial bidding
line”; and another wrote: “Wrong estimation of the costs
versus benefits”.
– Preference for taking risks – “Gambling” was a reason
given by a player.
– Enough money left in purse to protect all the time during
round 2 – which can be an indication of risk-averse be-
haviour coupled with economic wealth and no worries
of false alarms.
– Not enough money left in purse to bid successfully – a
participant wrote: “The purse is empty due to a lot of
floods”.
3.5 Decisions are better when they are made with the
help of unbiased forecasts, compared to having no
forecasts at all
The analysis of the results of round 2 allowed us to compare
the performance of participants with and without a forecast
set. Overall, participants without a second forecast set had an
average “true” performance value of 3.1, computed as shown
in Eq. (2) and over the five cases of round 2. The best perfor-
mance was equal to the optimal performance (“true” perfor-
mance value equal to 1) and the worst performance reached
a value of 6. Comparatively, participants with a second fore-
cast set had an average “true” performance of 1.2, thus much
closer to the optimal performance than the average perfor-
mance of participants without a second forecast set. The best
performance in this group also equalled the optimal perfor-
mance, while the worst performance value was 2.5, much
lower (i.e. thus much closer to the optimal value) than the
worst performance value of participants making their deci-
sions without any forecasts. These numbers clearly indicate
that the possession of a forecast set in the second round led to
higher performances and to a lower spread in performances
within the group of players with a second probabilistic fore-
cast set (compared to players without forecasts in round 2).
Does this conclusion however depend on the participants’
performances in round 1? Do you need to be a good decision-
maker to benefit from the forecasts in hand? Our results sug-
gest otherwise. All the participants with a bad performance
in the first round and a forecast set in round 2 had a good
performance in the second round. This indicates that even if
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those participants had a bad performance in round 1, they
took advantage of the forecasts and had a good performance
in round 2. Additionally, 57 out of 59 participants with a
good performance in round 1 and no forecasts in round 2
had a bad performance in the second round. This therefore
indicates that no matter how well the participants performed
in round 1, the possession of a forecast set led to better deci-
sions in round 2.
All the participants without a second forecast set who were
assigned the yellow river missed the first two floods in the
second round. Some of these participants purchased flood
protection for all or some of the subsequent cases, while the
others never bought any protection. It could have been due
to the low flood frequency of their river in the first round
(see Table 1). This behaviour was not observed for the green
river participants without a second forecast set, for which a
very diverse sequence of decisions was seen in the second
round. As for the blue river participants without any second
forecast set, most of them missed the first flood event that oc-
curred in round 2 and, subsequently, purchased flood protec-
tion for a few cases where no flood actually occurred. These
decision patterns were not observed for participants with a
second forecast set within each river, who took more consis-
tently right decisions.
The large majority of participants with a second forecast
set in round 2 (41 out of 44) rated their forecasts as either
“quite good” or “very good”, which was expected since all
the forecasts were unbiased in round 2. The three remaining
participants said that their second forecast set was “neither
good nor bad” or “quite bad”. These participants all had bi-
ased forecasts in the first round and their behaviour during
round 2 suggested that they might have been influenced by
the bias in their forecasts for round 1.
3.6 Overall winning strategies would combine good
performance with an accurate assessment of the
value of the forecasts
The average final purse at the end of round 2 was 3149 to-
kens (3341 tokens for participants without a second forecast
set and 2778 tokens for participants with a second forecast
set), remaining from the 20 000 tokens initially given to each
participant. The minimum final purses observed were zero
tokens or less. Twenty-five participants, out of the total of
129 players, finished the game with such amounts of tokens.
Out of these 25 participants, 22 had received a biased forecast
set in the first round. From the analysis of the game work-
sheets, we could detect three main losing strategies followed
by these 25 participants who finished with zero tokens or less
in purse.
1. Eighteen participants, most of them blue river players,
had an “acceptable to bad” performance in round 1 (per-
formances ranging between 1.3 and 3), did not purchase
a second forecast set, and performed badly in round 2
(performances ranging between 2.3 and 6).
Table 5. Average values of “avoided cost” for round 2, average bid
for a second forecast set and average “new bid” if forecasts were
considered not worth the price originally paid. Values are in tokens
and for the three different rivers.
River Average Average Average
“avoided cost” bid “new bid”
Yellow 7251 7929 7083
Green 5829 7083 6224
Blue 5711 6889 5875
2. Four players, mostly in charge of the yellow river, had
a “good to bad” performance in round 1 (performances
ranging between 1 and 3), purchased a second forecast
set for 10 000 tokens or higher, and performed very well
in round 2 (performances of 1).
3. Three participants, all green river players, had a “good
to acceptable” performance in round 1 (performances
ranging between 1 and 1.5), bought a second forecast set
for 6000–8000 tokens, but performed badly in round 2
(performances ranging between 2 and 2.5).
The winners of the game, six players in total, finished
round 2 with 8000 or 12 000 tokens in their purse. Half of
these participants were assigned the green river and the other
half the blue river. Apart from one participant, all had re-
ceived a biased forecast set in the first round. Most partic-
ipants had a “good to acceptable” performance in the first
round (performances ranging between 1 and 1.7), did not pur-
chase any forecast set and had a “good to bad” performance
in the second round (performances ranging between 1 and
3). Their performance in round 2 did not lead to large money
losses, as it did for yellow river participants, which can be
explained by the fact that they did not have so many flood
events in this round (see Table 1).
The average “avoided cost”, the average bid for a second
forecast set and the average “new bid” are presented in Ta-
ble 5 for each river. By comparing the “avoided cost” with
the average bid for each river, it is noticeable that the aver-
age bid was larger than the “avoided cost” of each river. On
average participants paid 1000 tokens more for their second
forecast set than the benefit, in terms of tokens spared in the
second round, that they derived from having this forecast set.
This could explain why none of the winners of the game had
a forecast set in the second round. From the average “new
bid”, it is evident that participants would have liked to pay
less on average than what they originally paid for their sec-
ond forecast set. For all the rivers, the average ‘new bid’ is
closer to the “avoided cost” than the average bid of partici-
pants during the auction.
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4 Discussion
4.1 Experiment results and implications
It was clear during the game that most participants had used
the probabilistic forecasts they were given at the beginning
of the game to help them in their decisions. This was an im-
portant issue in our game since it was an essential condition
to then be able to evaluate how the participants were using
their forecasts and to understand the links between the way
they perceived the quality of their forecasts and the way they
rated their performance at the end of a round. There was evi-
dence that participants were mostly using the 50th percentile
of the forecast distributions, but, interestingly, the median
alone could not explain all the decisions made. Other aspects
of the game might have also shaped the participants’ use of
the information, such as the discovery, during the first round,
of the forecast set bias (i.e. two out of three forecast sets
were purposely biased for round 1). This was also mentioned
by some participants at the end of some applications of the
game, who said that the fact of noticing the presence of a bias
(or suspecting it, since they were not told beforehand that the
forecasts were biased) led them to adjust the way they were
using the information. This could suggest that forecasts, even
biased, can still be useful for decision-making, compared to
no forecasts at all, if users are aware of the bias and know
how to consider it before making a decision.
Interestingly, in the analysis of the worksheets, there was
an indication that the players had, however, different toler-
ances to the different biases. Indeed, a lower tolerance for
under-predictive forecasts than for over-predictive forecasts
was identified. Biased forecasts were hence problematic for
the users and indicative of the manner in which the infor-
mation was used. This strongly indicates that there is an im-
portant need for probabilistic forecasts to be bias-corrected
previously to decision-making, a crucial aspect for applica-
tions such as flood forecasting, for instance (Hashino et al.,
2007; Pitt, 2008).
There was additionally evidence that, in a few cases, some
participants with unbiased forecasts did not use their fore-
casts (when considering the 50th percentile as key forecast
information). The analysis suggested that the players’ risk
perception, triggered by the initial river level or the prox-
imity of the forecast median to the flood threshold, might
have been a reason for this. This led to less consistent ac-
tions, where participants based their decisions on extremes
of the forecast distribution (other percentiles of the forecast)
or on no apparent information contained in the forecast dis-
tribution. A similar finding was reported by Kirchhoff et al.
(2013) through a case study in America, where it was found
that the perception of a risk was a motivational driver of a wa-
ter manager’s use of climate information. There is a constant
effort from forecasters to produce and provide state-of-the-
art probabilistic forecasts to their users. However, it was seen
here that even participants with unbiased forecasts did not al-
ways use them. This is an indication that further work needs
to be done on fostering communication between forecasters
and users, to promote an enhanced use of the information
contained in probabilistic forecasts.
From the results, it also appeared that the participants had
an accurate perception of their decision-maker performance
and related it to the quality of their forecasts. This implies
that participants viewed their forecasts as key elements of
their decision-making. This result is very encouraging for
forecasters and also bears important implications for the real
world. It could indeed suggest that decision-makers forget
that their own interpretation of the forecasts is as important
as the information held in the forecast itself, as there is a myr-
iad of ways to interpret and use probabilistic forecasts for
decision-making. The choice of the percentile on which the
decisions are based is an example of such an interpretation.
This could potentially mean that decision-makers will tend
to blame (thank) the forecast providers for their own wrong
(good) decisions.
Many papers have shown, through different approaches,
the expected benefits of probabilistic forecasts vs. determin-
istic forecasts for flood warning (e.g. Buizza, 2008; Verkade
and Werner, 2011; Pappenberger et al., 2015; Ramos et al.,
2013). However, many challenges still exist in the opera-
tional use of probabilistic forecasting systems and the opti-
misation of decision-making. This paper is a contribution to
improve our understanding of the way the benefits of prob-
abilistic forecasts are perceived by the decision-makers. It
proposes to investigate it from a different perspective, by al-
lowing, through a game experiment, decision-makers to bid
for a probabilistic forecast set during an auction. The auction
was used in this paper as an attempt to characterise and un-
derstand the participants’ WTP for a probabilistic forecast in
the specific flood protection risk-based experiment designed
for this purpose. Our results indicate that the WTP displays
dependencies on various aspects.
The bids were to a certain extent influenced by the par-
ticipants’ economic situation. They were on average posi-
tively related to the money available to participants during
the auction. Nonetheless, this was mainly a factor for partic-
ipants who had little money left in their purses at the time of
the auction. The participants’ perceived forecast quality was
also a factor influencing their WTP for another forecast set.
Players who had played the first round with biased forecasts
were less prone to disburse money for another forecast set for
the second round. There was moreover an indication that the
flood frequency of the river might have influenced the WTP
for a forecast set. Some players in charge of a river with only
one flood event in the first round (i.e. low flood risk) did not
consider beneficial the purchase of a forecast set for the sec-
ond round. The participants’ risk perception was therefore an
important element of their WTP for a probabilistic forecast.
The more risk-averse participants did not buy a second fore-
cast set as they had enough money to protect all the time;
“gambling” was also stated as a reason for not buying a sec-
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ond forecast set. Seifert et al. (2013) have similarly shown
that “the demand for flood insurance is strongly positively
related to individual risk perceptions”.
These results show that the perceived benefit of proba-
bilistic forecasts as a support of decision-making in a risk-
based context is multifaceted, and varies not only with the
quality of the information and its understanding, but also
with the relevance and the risk tolerance of the user. This
further demonstrates that more work is needed not solely
to provide guidance on the use of probabilistic information
for decision-making, but also to develop efficient ways to
communicate the actual relevance and evaluate the long-term
economic benefits of probabilistic forecasts for improved de-
cisions in various applications of probabilistic forecasting
systems within the water sector. This could additionally pro-
vide insights into bridging the gap between the theoretical
or expected benefit of probabilistic forecasts in a risk-based
decision-making environment and the perceived benefits by
key users.
4.2 Game limitations and further developments
This paper aimed to depict behaviours in the flood fore-
casting and protection decision-making context. Although
game experiments offer a flexible assessment framework,
compared to real operational configurations, it is however
extremely complex to search for general explanatory be-
haviours in such a context. This is partially due to the unique-
ness of individuals and the interrelated factors that might in-
fluence decisions, which are both aspects that are difficult to
evaluate when playing a game with a large audience. A so-
lution to overcome this, as proposed by Crochemore et al.
(2015), could be to prolong the game by incorporating a dis-
cussion with the audience or with selected individuals, aim-
ing at understanding the motivations hidden underneath their
decisions during the game. Having more time available to
apply the game would also allow one to play more cases in
each round, bringing additional information to the analysis
and clarifying key aspects of the game, such as the effect of
the bias on the participants’ use of the forecasts and on their
WTP for more forecasts. Co-designing such an experiment
with social anthropologists could bring to light many more
insights into participants’ decision-making behaviours.
Being set up as a game, this study also presents some lim-
itations. As mentioned by Breidert et al. (2006), a source of
bias in such studies is their artificial set-up. Indeed, under
those circumstances, participants are not directly affected by
their decisions, as they neither use their own money nor is the
risk a real one. This might lead them to make decisions which
they would normally not make in real life or in operational
forecasting contexts.
Moreover, in our game, the costs given to both flood pro-
tection and flood damages were not chosen to represent the
real costs that one encounters in real environments. First,
real costs in integrated flood forecasting and protection sys-
tems are difficult to assess, given the complexity of flood
protection and its consequences. Secondly, the external im-
posed conditions for playing our game (i.e. the fact that we
wanted to play it during oral talks in conferences, workshops
or teaching classes, with expected eclectic audiences of vari-
able sizes, having a limited amount of time, and using paper
worksheets to be collected at the end of the game for the anal-
ysis) were not ideal to handle any controversy on the realism
(or absence of realism) of the game scenario.
It is however arguable whether the game results could be
a reflection of the experiment set-up, and hence of the pa-
rameters of the game (the protection and damage costs, the
number of flood events, etc.). For instance, the higher dam-
age costs might have influenced the participants’ tolerance to
misses and false alarms. Further developments could include
testing the influence of the parameters of this experiment on
its results as a means of analysing the sensitivity of flood
protection mitigation to a specific decision-making setting.
Additionally, the small sample size of this experiment lim-
ited the statistical significance of its results. Replicating it
could ascertain some of the key points discussed, leading to
more substantial conclusions, and improve our understand-
ing of the effect of the professional background of the partic-
ipants on their decisions.
Finally, the experiment’s complex structure was its
strength as well as its weakness. When analysing the game
results, the chicken and egg situation arose. Several factors
of the participants’ use of the forecasts and of their WTP
for a forecast set were identified, but it was not possible to
measure causalities. It would therefore be interesting to carry
out further work in this direction, together with behavioural
psychologists, by, for instance, testing the established factors
separately.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented the results of a risk-based decision-
making game, called “How much are you prepared to pay for
a forecast?”, played at several workshops and conferences
in 2015. It was designed to contribute to the understanding
of the role of probabilistic forecasts in decision-making pro-
cesses and their perceived value by decision-makers for flood
protection mitigation.
There were hints that participants’ decisions to protect (or
not) against floods were made based on the probabilistic fore-
casts and that the forecast median alone did not account for
all the decisions made. Where participants were presented
with biased forecasts, they adjusted the manner in which they
were using the information, with an overall lower tolerance
for misses than for false alarms. Participants with unbiased
forecasts also showed inconsistent decisions, which appeared
to be shaped by their risk perception; the initial river level
and the proximity of the forecast median to the flood thresh-
old both led the participants to base their decisions on ex-
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tremes of the forecast distribution or on no apparent infor-
mation contained in the forecast.
The participants’ willingness-to-pay for a probabilistic
forecast, in a second round of the game, was furthermore in-
fluenced by their economic situation, their perception of the
forecasts’ quality and the river flood frequency.
Overall, participants had an accurate perception of their
decision-making performance, which they related to the
quality of their forecasts. However, there appeared to be dif-
ficulties in the estimation of the added value of the proba-
bilistic forecasts for decision-making, thus leading the par-
ticipants who bought a second forecast set to end the game
with a lower amount of money in hand.
The use and perceived benefit of probabilistic forecasts
as a support of decision-making in a risk-based context is a
complex topic. The paper has shown the factors that need to
be considered when providing guidance on the use of prob-
abilistic information for decision-making and developing ef-
ficient ways to communicate their actual relevance for im-
proved decisions for various applications. Games such as
this one are useful tools for better understanding and dis-
cussing decision-making among forecasters and stakehold-
ers, as well as highlighting potential factors that influence
decision-makers and that deserve further research.
6 Resources
This version of the game is licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0
(Creative Commons public license). It is part of the activ-
ities of HEPEX (Hydrologic Ensemble Prediction Experi-
ment) and is freely available at www.hepex.org. This game
was inspired by the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre
game “Paying for Predictions” (http://www.climatecentre.
org/resources-games/paying-for-predictions).
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Appendix A: Example of a worksheet distributed to the
game participants (here for river blue and the set 1 of
positively biased forecasts: BLUE-1)
BLUE-1
How much are you prepared to PAY for a forecast?
Occupation (student, PhD candidate, scientist, operational hydrologist, forecaster, professor, lecturer, other):
..............................
How many years of experience do you have?  < 5 years  5 to 10 years  > 10 years
Flood protection = -2,000 tokens; flood without protection = -4,000 tokens
Flood occurs at 90 or above
Round
Case
River level
before rainfall
(10-60)
Flood
protection?
River level
increment
(10-80)
River level
after
increment
Flood?
(≥ 90)
Tokens
spent
Purse
(20,000)
1
1 Yes  No  Yes  No 
2 Yes  No  Yes  No 
3 Yes  No  Yes  No 
4 Yes  No  Yes  No 
5 Yes  No  Yes  No 
• How was your forecast set in Round 1?
 very bad  quite bad  neither good nor bad  quite good  very good  I don’t know
• How was your performance as a decision-maker in Round 1?
 very bad  quite bad  neither good nor bad  quite good  very good  I don’t know
Round 2
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Do not forget to transfer your final Round 1 purse to Round 2 (in the brackets under ‘Purse’)
Round
Case
River level
before rainfall
(10-60)
Flood
protection?
River level
increment
(10-80)
River level
after
increment
Flood?
(≥ 90)
Tokens
spent
Purse
(...........)
Bid: .............. tokens. Did you buy a probabilistic forecast set? YES / NO
If yes, deduct the money you paid for it here:
2
1 Yes  No  Yes  No 
2 Yes  No  Yes  No 
3 Yes  No  Yes  No 
4 Yes  No  Yes  No 
5 Yes  No  Yes  No 
• How was your performance as a decision-maker in Round 2?
 very bad  quite bad  neither good nor bad  quite good  very good  I don’t know
• For the people who DID NOT buy a forecast set:
– Why didn’t you buy a forecast set?
 The model did not seem reliable
 The price was too high
 Other reason (explain): ..................................................................................................
• For the people who DID buy a forecast set:
– How was your forecast set in Round 2?
 very bad  quite bad  neither good nor bad  quite good  very good  I don’t know
– Were the forecasts worth what you paid for them?  Yes  No
– If not, how many tokens would you now pay for them? ............ tokens
Please return this worksheet into the envelope and give it to one of the assistants before you leave.
Thank you for your participation!
We hope you enjoyed it!
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The Supplement related to this article is available online
at doi:10.5194/hess-20-3109-2016-supplement.
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